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If the United Nations hopes to continue commanding theworld’s respect, it is essential that the organization growstronger, not only in its defiance of intransigent political
leaders, but also in its willingness and ability to protect ordi-
nary people from the violence and deprivation inflicted upon
them in situations of armed conflict. States will be reluctant
to contribute forces to peacekeeping missions if there is a high
risk that their peacekeeping role will not be respected and that
they may themselves become the subject of attack. An evalu-
ation of the effectiveness of the 1994 Convention on the
Safety of UN and Associated Personnel (Safety Convention)
in protecting peacekeepers from attack and so facilitating
them in their role as “the world community’s avatars of inter-
national peace and security” will demonstrate the current
inadequacy of existing protection for UN peacekeeping forces. 
While the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and subsequent pro-
tocols regulate the conduct of combatants engaged in armed
conflicts, prior to 1994, no instrument pro-
hibited or provided legal remedies for
attacks against forces performing tradi-
tional peacekeeping functions, such as
facilitating ceasefires and maintaining
buffer zones between the parties to the
conflict in order to contain hostilities while
the belligerents worked out a peace agree-
ment. The Safety Convention was adopted
by the UN General Assembly on December
9, 1994, and entered into force on January
15, 1999. Its purpose is to protect UN and
associated personnel from becoming the
object of attack by purporting to crimi-
nalize attacks by other armed forces on
peacekeeping troops. The majority of states
that have signed the Safety Convention
have yet to ratify it. 
The Safety Convention enhances the protection of peace-
keepers by providing a means of prosecuting attacks on UN
personnel as crimes under international law. It is not the
only means of prosecuting such attacks, however. Article 8 of
the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (Rome
Statute) also provides a means of prosecuting these crimes, but
only in situations where the law of international armed con-
flict applies. Article 8, paragraph 2(b) gives the International
Criminal Court jurisdiction over serious violations of the laws
and customs applicable in international armed conflict includ-
ing, under 8(b)(iii), “intentionally directing attacks against per-
sonnel, installations, materials, units or vehicles involved in
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping missions in accor-
dance with the Charter of the UN, as long as they are entitled
to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the
international law of armed conflict.” Article 8, paragraph
2(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute also prohibits attacks on peace-
keepers “so long as they are entitled to the protection given
to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of
armed conflict.” 
The scope of the Safety Convention is broader than the
Rome Statute, but it is poorly drafted. Lack of clarity and the
failure to define key criteria will make it difficult to success-
fully prosecute crimes under this convention. An assessment
of the merits and weaknesses of the Safety Convention will likely
prove it more aspirational than effective.
The Genesis and Development of Peacekeeping and 
Peace-Support Operations
The UN has primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security. In this context, the UN
Charter provides for coercive measures to compel states to com-
ply with resolutions taken by the Security Council. These
coercive measures require achieving and maintaining a con-
sensus among the permanent members of the Security Coun-
cil. As a result of the divisions of the Cold War, effective
action by the Security Council was blocked and the concept
of UN peacekeeping came into existence. Although not specif-
ically provided for in the Charter, peacekeeping operations
were intended to end hostilities by peace-
ful means and create a climate in which the
peacemaking process could be success-
fully pursued. The first UN peacekeeping
force, the United Nations Emergency
Force, was deployed in response to the
Suez crisis of 1956. Its purpose was to sep-
arate the belligerent forces and supervise
the withdrawal of foreign troops from
Egypt while a political settlement was being
discussed. Other early peacekeeping mis-
sions such as the United Nations Peace-
keeping Force in Cyprus, the United
Nations Emergency Force II, and the
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
followed. These traditional peacekeeping
missions are often referred to as “first-generation” peace-
keeping missions. 
In recent years, the traditionally passive role engendered
by such missions has been replaced by a more active role of
peace making involving, inter alia, national reconstruction, facil-
itating transition to democracy, and providing humanitarian
assistance. Initially referred to as “second-generation” or
multi-dimensional peacekeeping, the more generic title of
“peace support operations” has been adopted to cover the wide
range of activities involved. Peace support operations differ
from traditional first-generation peacekeeping in that man-
dates are generally more complex and often involve peace-
building activities such as providing development aid, imple-
menting arms control measures, organizing elections, and
monitoring human rights violations. These measures go fur-
ther than acting as a buffer to keep peace between belliger-
ent parties, and are intended to assist in the rebuilding of states
and the fostering of an environment for long-term peace. 
In response to the intra-state conflicts that have become so
prevalent in the post-Cold War period, coercive peacekeeping
operations, often referred to as “peace enforcement opera-
tions,” have also been deployed. These operations have
stronger mandates than traditional peacekeeping or peace sup-
port operations. Peace enforcement operations are highly
continued on next page
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controversial because they blur the line between peacekeep-
ing under the Safety Convention and enforcement action
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UN forces can find
themselves operating in complex political situations where the
legal framework within which they must act is unclear. For
example, in his report on UN operations in Bosnia, the sec-
retary-general explained that there was confusion over the role
of the UN Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia (UNPRO-
FOR). Some nations that had not contributed troops wanted
to expand the UNPROFOR mandate to use the peacekeeping
force to directly confront the Bosnian Serbs, but nations that
had contributed troops wanted to avoid such confrontation.
As a result, the forces deployed were largely configured and
equipped for traditional peacekeeping duties rather than
enforcement action, meaning that they were few in number
and lightly armed. In an effort to find some consensus within
the Security Council:
resolutions were adopted in which some of the more
robust language favoured by the non-troop-con-
tributing nations was accommodated. Chapter VII was
invoked with increasing frequency, though often
without specifying what that implied in terms of
UNPROFOR operations. In this way, the efforts of
Member States to find compromise between diver-
gent positions led to the UNPROFOR mandate
becoming rhetorically more robust than the Force
itself.
Peace support operations have been mounted in conflict sit-
uations where clashes involving local actors and UN soldiers
were inevitable because the local population had not con-
sented to their presence. Recent conflicts in Bosnia and
Rwanda, among others, have involved direct attacks on the civil-
ian population as part of the war objective of belligerent fac-
tions. Often combatants are not soldiers of regular armies, but
of militias or groups of armed civilians with little discipline and
an ill-defined command structure. There is a danger in these
situations that boundaries between the different types of peace
support operations and their level of acceptable participation
in the conflict can become blurred. In response to a 1993
incident in Somalia, one of several incidents in which UN
troops killed a number of civilians, the UN military spokesman
in Mogadishu commented, “Everyone on the ground in that
vicinity was a combatant, because they meant to do us harm.”
Ultimately, forces deployed on a peace support mission may
find that by using military power to protect an area, they are
drawn inexorably into the struggle and cannot avoid taking
sides.
The 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and
Associated Personnel
Peacekeeping forces established pursuant to a resolution
of the Security Council or General Assembly are entitled to the
privileges and immunities of the UN provided for in Article
105 of the UN Charter, and in the UN Convention on the Priv-
ileges and Immunities of the UN. The secretary-general usu-
ally tries to arrange a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with
the state involved to agree upon the applicable arrangements
and conditions during the operation. The high rate of casu-
alties sustained in the conflicts in Somalia, the former
Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, however, has alerted troop-con-
tributing-states to the inadequacy of existing protection for
peacekeeping forces. 
After only nine months of deliberations, the UN adopted
the Convention for the Safety of UN and Associated Person-
nel as a solution to the lack of international protection for UN
peacekeeping forces. While attacks on peacekeepers are nor-
mally treated as domestic crimes under the criminal laws of
the host state, the law enforcement capabilities of a state
requiring outside forces for internal stability are generally
insufficient to investigate, try, and prosecute persons for such
crimes. The Safety Convention clarifies the protective duties
of the host state, strengthening these duties in situations
where the convention applies. 
Protective Duties of the Host State under the Convention
Under Article 7 of the Safety Convention, states parties are
required to “take all appropriate measures to ensure the
safety and security of UN and associated personnel.” Under
Article 11, states parties must cooperate in preventing crimes
against protected personnel. States parties are required to take
“all practicable measures” to prevent preparations in their ter-
ritories for such crimes, and to exchange information and coor-
dinate “administrative and other measures” to prevent their
commission. The Safety Convention is also the first interna-
tional agreement to establish that captured peacekeepers are
entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions,
although under the Safety Convention the prisoners must
be returned immediately. Under the Geneva Conventions
prisoners can be held until the cessation of hostilities. 
States parties are required to make attacks or threats against
UN and associated personnel crimes under their national
law and to either prosecute or extradite alleged offenders. The
Safety Convention permits states party to it to establish extra-
territorial jurisdiction over prohibited crimes where such
crimes have allegedly been committed against that state’s
own nationals or where such crimes have allegedly been com-
mitted “in an attempt to compel that State to do or to abstain
from doing any act.” These broad jurisdictional provisions
expand opportunities for enforcement by allowing the more
continued on next page
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Kenyan Peacekeeper for the United Nations Mission in
Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) before going on a patrol.
UNMEE was established by the Security Council in July 2000 to
verify a ceasefire agreement. In September 2000, the Council
authorized deployment within UNMEE of up to 4,200 military
personnel to monitor the ceasefire and assist in ensuring obser-
vance of security commitments.
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activist states to prosecute where the host state is reluctant. The
Safety Convention does not apply to all situations in which UN
personnel are deployed on peacekeeping operations, however,
and it is extremely difficult for both the UN and parties to the
conflict to determine when the Safety Convention applies
and when it does not.
Determining When the Convention Applies
Throughout the negotiations, those drafting the Safety
Convention had to pursue two almost irreconcilable objectives:
guaranteeing protection to as many UN personnel as possible
while preventing extension of the convention’s scope of appli-
cation so widely as to prevent certain states from ratifying it.
Many states were critical of the scope and expansion of the
Security Council’s activities in recent years,
and sought to limit the application of the
Safety Convention to traditional peace-
keeping operations. The Preamble
acknowledges the contribution of UN per-
sonnel in the fields of preventive diplo-
macy, peace making, peacekeeping, peace
building and humanitarian and other oper-
ations, but there is no specific mention of
“peace enforcement” operations. Rather,
the traditional characteristics of peace-
keeping operations are emphasized. The
Preamble states that “the effectiveness and
safety of United Nations operations are
enhanced where such operations are con-
ducted with the consent and cooperation
of the host State,” and Article 20 states that
nothing in the Safety Convention shall
affect, inter alia, “[t]he rights and obliga-
tions of States, consistent with the Charter
of the United Nations, regarding the con-
sent to entry of persons into their territories.” Article 21 of the
convention permits the use of force in self-defense. Article 6
calls on UN personnel to respect the laws of the host state and
to refrain from any action or activity incompatible with the
impartial and international nature of its duties. These provi-
sions reflect traditional operations rather than operations
that involve coercive measures against the host state or de facto
powers involved in the conflict. Yet, it is in the more contro-
versial peace enforcement operations that UN personnel are
at greatest risk, and it was the extensive casualties that have
occurred in these types of operations that initially triggered
the demand for protection.
Originally, the Safety Convention was to be limited to
operations “established pursuant to a mandate approved by
a resolution of the Security Council,” but its scope was even-
tually expanded. Article 1(c) provides that an operation cov-
ered by the convention must be one that is “established by the
competent organ of the United Nations in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations and conducted under
United Nations authority and control.” Therefore, opera-
tions authorized as opposed to mandated by the Security Coun-
cil, but carried out under the command and control of one
or more states, are outside the scope of the Safety Convention.
The mandated operations must be: (1) for the purpose of
maintaining or restoring international peace and security;
or (2) where an exceptional risk to the safety of the person-
nel participating in the operation exists, as decided by the Secu-
rity Counsel or General Assembly.
The Safety Convention attempts to distinguish between sit-
uations in which the convention applies and those in which
humanitarian law is applicable, so that UN and associated per-
sonnel and those who attack them will be covered by one
regime or the other, but not both. This strategy enables the
Safety Convention to avoid undermining the Geneva Con-
ventions, which rely in part for their effectiveness on all forces
being treated equally. Professor Sharp of Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center is extremely critical of this approach,
believing that it reflects pre-Charter thinking condoning the
aggressive use of force. He claims that since UN forces serve
the world community, all UN personnel should be made
unlawful targets under all circumstances.
The negotiators of the Safety Convention believed that if
it became a crime to engage in combat with UN forces when
they act as combatants, this could have a dramatic impact on
other parties’ willingness to adhere to
accepted principles of humanitarian law.
Negotiators feared that if UN forces acting
as combatants were entitled to the pro-
tection of the Safety Convention (whereby
an attack upon UN forces would be a crime
even though they were engaged in com-
bat) the belligerent parties would see it as
gross injustice and not abide by any laws at
all. A primary inducement to comply with
any law is the belief that law applies equally
to everyone and therefore it is in all parties’
interests to comply.
To ensure consistency with the Geneva
Conventions, Article 2(2) provides that
the Safety Convention shall not apply to a
UN operation authorized by the Security
Council as an enforcement action under
Chapter VII “if any of the forces are
engaged as combatants against organized
armed forces and the operation is one to
which the law of international armed conflict applies.” Even
if only part of the operation fulfils these conditions, all of the
UN elements participating in that operation will be excluded
from its protection. Common Article 2 of the Geneva Con-
ventions provides that the Conventions shall apply to armed
conflict between “two or more of the High Contracting Par-
ties, even if a state of war is not recognised by one of them.”
The same trigger point is used in the Safety Convention to
determine when UN peacekeeping forces cease to be covered
by the Safety Convention. There is a strong argument that
where foreign troops are involved in an internal armed con-
flict the rules of international armed conflict should apply. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has sug-
gested that “the outsider status of United Nations forces log-
ically [requires these forces to] be subject to the rules of
international humanitarian law applicable in international
armed conflicts.”
The difficulty of distinguishing between peacekeeping and
enforcement operations has not been properly recognized.
The fact that an action is based on Chapter VII of the Char-
ter does not automatically rule out application of the Safety
Convention and render international humanitarian law applic-
able instead. The Safety Convention ceases to apply only in
cases of armed confrontation between forces deployed by
the United Nations and organized armed forces. The problem
is when and who determines that a confrontation between UN
28
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troops and others reaches the threshold that the participants
may be regarded as combatants under Article 2(2) of the
Safety Convention. For example, capturing peacekeepers is ille-
gal and can be prosecuted as a crime. Once UN forces begin
acting as combatants against organized armed forces, and
the operation is one to which the law of international armed
conflict applies, they then have the status of combatants. As
such, acts against them are covered by international human-
itarian law rather than the Safety Convention. Capturing com-
batants is not a crime, provided that they are treated accord-
ing to the rules of the Geneva Conventions.
Identifying if any personnel are engaged as combatants
against organized armed forces, and whether the operation is one
to which the law of international armed conflict
applies may be difficult in practice. The
American Bar Association noted that “it is
asking too much for a Somali clan warrior
or Bosnian militiaman” to understand the
distinctions in levels of conflict. UN forces
will have to constantly evaluate whether
the situation can be classified as one of
armed conflict, and then whether or not
the use of force is sufficient to change their
status from that of peacekeeper to that of
combatant, in order to determine their
obligations and protection status. It remains
unclear at what point paramilitary forces
engaged in a conflict constitute “organized
forces” for the purposes of the Safety Con-
vention. 
The trend of the last 50 years has been
to make the threshold for the application
of the laws of international armed conflict
as low as possible. The Safety Convention
may work against this trend because it is likely that the UN and
troop contributing states will be reluctant to recognize that the
convention has ceased to apply. This may inflate the level of
conflict required before acknowledging that “armed conflict”
is taking place. The fact that there is no agreement on which
provisions of humanitarian law apply to UN personnel, and
in what circumstances, can only add to the confusion. 
International Humanitarian Law and UN Operations
There is evidence that UN forces have themselves engaged
in conduct and practices that are contrary to humanitarian law.
One report on the Somalia peacekeeping mission concludes
that these were “not cases of undisciplined actions by individual
soldiers, but stem from the highest echelons of the command
structure.” Respect for the privileged status of UN forces is likely
to be undermined if such forces themselves violate humani-
tarian law. There is also the issue of whether UN forces should
be bound under the obligation to ensure respect for the
Geneva Conventions in Common Article 1 to prevent immi-
nent violations of international humanitarian law. Most lightly
armed peacekeepers are not able to prevent large-scale abuses.
The definition of when the Geneva Conventions apply,
described in Common Article 2, was designed to avoid the need
for a formal declaration of war as a preliminary to their appli-
cation. The substitution of the more general expression
“armed conflict” for “war” was intended to ensure that the
Geneva Convention would apply to any difference arising
between two states and leading to the intervention of mem-
bers of the armed forces, even if one of the states parties
denied the existence of a state of war. But what are the crite-
ria for determining when a conflict in which UN forces are
deployed reaches the level of armed conflict? The United States
argued that although thirty United States soldiers had been
killed and nearly two hundred wounded, and despite many
hundreds more Somali casualties, there had yet to be an
event in Somalia “that makes it clear to everyone that this is
combat, not peacekeeping.” 
A number of national military courts held that the Geneva
Conventions did not apply to the UNOSOM II (United Nations
Operations in Somalia II) mission in Somalia. The Court
Martial Appeal Court of Canada held in R. v. Brocklebank that
Private Brocklebank, who was arrested for aiding and abetting
the torture of a Somali teenager, had no legal obligation to
ensure the safety of a prisoner because neither the Geneva Con-
ventions nor Additional Protocol II applied
to peacekeeping operations. The Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol
therefore did not apply to Canadian Forces
in Somalia. A Belgian military court inves-
tigating violations of humanitarian law by
Belgian forces also came to a similar con-
clusion. 
The UN argues that it is not a state and
hence not legally bound by the Geneva
Conventions. It also argues that there are
political and practical difficulties if the
UN were to be bound by the rules of inter-
national humanitarian law. Under the UN
Model Agreement with troop contributing
states and the Model SOFA between the
UN and host states the UN undertakes to
“observe and respect the principles and
spirit of the general international con-
ventions applicable to the conduct of mil-
itary personnel.” The ICRC has pushed
for recognition that international humanitarian law should
apply whenever United Nations forces must resort to force. The
secretary-general, in his Bulletin on the Observance by UN
forces of International Humanitarian Law, stated that “the fun-
damental principles and rules of international humanitarian
law are applicable to UN forces when in situations of armed
conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the
extent and for the duration of their engagement. Therefore
they are applicable in enforcement actions, or in peace-
keeping operations when the use of force is permitted in self-
defense.” Determining at what point UN forces become com-
batants is problematic since there must be a threshold level
of force to be crossed—soldiers may use some level of force
in self-defense and yet not be considered combatants. 
The Safety Convention has been criticized on the grounds
that by retaining this ill-defined threshold mechanism the
convention effectively puts control of the protection status of
UN forces in the hands of the belligerent forces that are the
target of the UN mission. If attacks against UN forces remain
at a low level with only a few people killed, then response by
the peacekeepers is unlikely to be strong enough to cross the
threshold above which the Safety Convention no longer
applies. If, however, the peacekeepers are subjected to mer-
ciless and relentless attacks, they may be forced into self-
defensive action that crosses that threshold. This separation
between convention regime and humanitarian law regime
Peacekeepers, continued from previous page
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seems unworkable. Some of the uncertainty could be reduced
by clearer statements on what principles of the law of war apply
to all UN military operations despite their characterization. 
Conclusion
The 1994 Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated
Personnel is an important step forward in advancing the pro-
tection and safety of UN peacekeepers. It creates a regime for
the prosecution or extradition of persons accused of attack-
ing UN peacekeepers and other persons associated with oper-
ations under UN mandates, which may help counter the
impression that UN forces can be attacked with impunity. Due
to the relatively short timeframe in which the convention was
drafted, many essential criteria are left vague and undefined,
resulting in a lack of clarity in its application. Hence, it pro-
vides only a preliminary and partial solution to averting and
redressing the dangers facing UN personnel in the field. 
Protection of UN peacekeeping forces is a priority for
both humane and pragmatic reasons. Troop contributing
states are unlikely to be willing to send forces to keep the peace
in a foreign conflict if they are likely to be attacked. The spe-
cial protection afforded peacekeeping forces reflects their
status as non-combatants, but many peace support missions
involve “robust” measures to enforce peace in which it may be
difficult to determine at what point UN forces cease to be non-
combatants. While the Safety Convention does not expressly
mention “peace enforcement” operations, it is in precisely
these types of operations that UN personnel are at greatest risk.
Further, for political and constitutional reasons no troops
have ever served under the full command and control of the
UN, and it is unlikely that they will do so in the foreseeable
future. From the point of view of the states or ethnic groups
that are the targets of the mission, “coalitions of the willing”
on coercive peace enforcement operations may seem indis-
tinguishable from combatants. 
The responsibility for working out whether a situation is
governed by the Safety Convention regime or humanitarian
law will lie with the commanders and soldiers in the field, and
the criteria on which they must rely are ill defined and prob-
ably unworkable in practice. It is difficult to know what
regime is applicable to a situation such as Somalia, in which
the Geneva Conventions were stated not to apply, yet the UN
forces viewed “everyone on the ground in that vicinity [as] a
combatant.” 
The crucial questions of UN liability for violations of
humanitarian law and the extent to which UN forces deployed
in an area are responsible for preventing imminent viola-
tions are also left vague. Respect for UN forces is likely to be
undermined if they make no effort to prevent violations of
humanitarian law, and it will certainly be undermined if they
actively participate in such violations. Most lightly armed
peacekeepers will not be in a position to prevent large-scale
abuses, but it does not seem right to allow UN forces to stand
idly by in circumstances where breaches of humanitarian law
are taking place in their area of operations. The Security
Convention provides that nothing shall affect the applicabil-
ity of humanitarian law and universally recognized standards
of human rights to UN operations. This does not, however, clar-
ify when humanitarian law applies, or the extent of UN oblig-
ations to uphold the relevant norms and principles.
As a compromise document, troop contributors may take
some solace from the fact that the troops serving with missions
are protected by the terms of the Safety Convention. Although
the convention represents an important step forward and
accession by all states party to it should be encouraged, it will
be ineffective as a means of prosecuting criminals if the cri-
teria by which such crimes are defined remains unclear. 
*Siobhán Wills is a D.Phil. student at Exeter College, Oxford. She
received her LL.M. from Yale and her LL.B. from the National Uni-
versity of Ireland, Galway.
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the Bush administration has sent
mixed messages about its support. The
administration has twice notified the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
that it supports ratification of CEDAW,
but a small minority on the far right has
been pressuring the administration to
change its position, citing objections to
elements of the treaty that have already
been addressed in the RUDs, or taking
the non-binding recommendations of
the CEDAW Committee out of con-
text. The administration is now show-
ing signs of yielding to that pressure. In
July, the administration cited the need
for the Department of Justice to con-
duct another review of the treaty. It
has not been forthcoming with results
of that review, or even a timeline.
While U.S. Senate action has been
stalled, support for ratification has con-
tinued to come from the states. To
date, legislatures in nine states have
endorsed U.S. ratification: California,
Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New York, North Car-
olina, and Vermont. The Connecticut
State Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives in Florida, South Dakota,
and Illinois also have endorsed U.S.
ratification.
Secretary of State Colin Powell
observed, “In today’s world, any Amer-
ican secretary of state, male or female,
must pay attention to the issues affect-
ing the rights and well-being of
women—over half the world’s popu-
lation. Women’s issues affect not only
women; they have profound implica-
tions for all humankind. Women’s
issues are human rights issues. . . . We,
as a world community, cannot even
begin to tackle the array of problems
and challenges confronting us with-
out the full and equal participation of
women in all aspects of life.”
Strong rhetoric on women’s human
rights is important, but action is more
important. With Republican control
of Congress, the president’s leader-
ship will hold more sway than ever. As
a treaty that establishes a badly needed
human rights standard for the treat-
ment of women and girls, CEDAW
deserves strong U.S. backing. U.S. rat-
ification of CEDAW will give action to
President Bush’s statement: “A thriving
nation will respect the rights of women
because no society can prosper while
denying opportunity for half its
citizens.” 
*Nora O’Connell is the legislative direc-
tor of Women’s EDGE. Ritu Sharma is the
co-founder and executive director of Women’s
EDGE.
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